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bring happiness) (Brittan 10/23/98, Lecture). By weighing the quantity and quality of happiness

provided by an action we can find it's morality or immorality. Mill justifies that happiness is moral

by making two claims: 1.) Happiness is an objective end of morality, because everyone desires it,

even though no one is sure why this is so (Mill 1979, pg. 34). All other acts or virtues are merely

an end or become the end to bringing about happiness for the self and others (Mill 1979, pg. 35).

2.) In regards to why we believe it is moral to be altruistic and bring happiness to other, Mill

argues that "we may answer, the same as of all other moral standards--the conscientious feelings of

mankind" (Mill 1979, pg. 28). In other words, what we feel is moral, i.e. what will bring the

greatest happiness to the greatest number in the greatest quality, partly comes not only in that we

believe happiness is moral, but that we have innate feelings that are shared by mankind which

determine, through common agreement, what is moral (Mill 1979, pg. 29). Finally, Mill made a

third point to justify the altruistic nature of Utilitarianism (Mill 1979, pg. 31):

"The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that exceptin some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body; and this association is riveted more and more, as mankind are further removed from the state of savage independence."

To see the importance of intelligence and personality in Utilitarianism we must focus our

investigation to the importance that Mill levees on the qualityof the happiness an action will bring

to others. To do this, we shall look at what Mill has written: "Of two pleasures, if there be one to

which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any

feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure" (Mill 1979, pg.8)

Following this, "few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals

for a promise of the fullest allowance of beast's pleasures; no intelligenthuman being would

consent to be a fool, no instructedperson would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and

conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the

dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs" (Mill 1979, pg. 9).

Finally, Mill states "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be

Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied" (Mill 1979, pg. 10). Mill's justification for this is that

those reliable and select individuals--the moral judges--who have had experience in both pleasures

of the beast and of the mind have almost always agreed that pleasure of the mind brings the greater

happiness. One might argue that most individuals prefer animal pleasures, but Mill would reply